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LEATHERS V. MEDLOCK: THE SUPREME COURT
CHANGES COURSE ON TAXING THE PRESS
On April 16, 1991, the United States Supreme Court decided Leathers
v. Medlock.1 Leathers drastically changed the landscape of the First Amend2
ment's Freedom of the Press Clause in the area of taxation of the media.
In Leathers, the Court held that an Arkansas sales tax could tax cable
television differently from other members of the media, thus severely
narrowing, if not implicitly reversing, several prior cases. 3 The newspaper,
magazine, broadcast television and cable industries, as well as state legislatures and state courts, will all feel the impact of Leathers.4 The result of
Leathers is that the Court essentially has tossed the matter of differential
taxation of the press back to the states with an important warning to avoid
certain types of media discrimination.5 Considering the direction that the
Court had been heading in this area-toward mandating tax equality for6
all the media-Leathers represents an important shift in Court policy.

1. 111 S. Ct. 1438 (1991).
2. See Timothy B. Dyk & Laura A. Kulwicki, Taxing the Media: An Examination of
Leathers v. Medlock, ST. TAx Norms, Apr. 9, 1991, at 54, 54 (observing that Leathers
substantially limited earlier taxation of press decisions). After Leathers, First Amendment
restraints on states' ability to tax the press were eased. Id.
The First Amendment states, "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press." U.S. CoNsrT. amend. I. Because of the language of the First
Amendment, some belief exists that the press enjoys special status under the First Amendment.
See David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REv. 455, 460-61
(1983) (discussing opposing views on whether press clause gives media special status). Justice
Potter Stewart was a leading advocate of the view that the press clause gives the media special
status not accorded to other businesses. Id. at 460. Professor William Van Alstyne argued
against special status for the press, noting that special status would invite additional regulation
of the press. Id. at 461.
3. See Dyk & Kulwicki, supra note 2, at 54 (stating that Leathers amounts to substantial
limitation of holdings of previous taxation of press cases); see infra notes 48-53 and accompanying text (discussing Leathers narrowing of previous press taxation cases' holdings).
4. See Eugene G. Sayre, Media Taxation: An Abrupt Change in Course, J. MULTIsTATE
TAX'N, Sept./Oct. 1991, at 148-52 (discussing impact of Leathers on states and different media
segments). Sayre argues that the result of Leathers will be decreased litigation. Id. at 152. It
is of interest to note that Sayre was the attorney for the cable petitioners in Leathers. Id. at
148. But see Dyk & Kulwicki, supra note 2, at 54 (stating that Leathers impact will lead to
increasing litigation as state, media, and courts struggle with decision).
5. See Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438, 1443 (1991) (holding that absent suppression
of ideas, states may extend generally applicable taxes to press). The Leathers Court discussed
the remaining three categories of protection: Content discrimination, taxing a small number
of media members, and singling out the press from other businesses. Id. at 1443-44; see infra
notes 116-26 and accompanying text (discussing policy reasons for giving states discretion on
taxing press and noting that giving states more discretion is positive step).
6. See infra notes 86-114 and accompanying text (discussing shift in Court policy toward
taxation of press); see also Dyk & Kulwicki, supra note 2, at 54 (noting far-reaching impact
of Leathers decision).
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Before discussing Leathers more fully, however, an understanding of the
7
Court's previous doctrine is necessary.

I.

P~vious CASE LAW
The Supreme Court's first foray into the field of taxation of the media
occurred in 1936.8 In Grosjean v. American Press Co. 9 the Court decided

that a Louisiana tax on newspapers violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 0
The Louisiana legislature had imposed a two percent license tax on publications that charged for advertising." The legislature exempted newspapers
with circulations less than 20,000.12 The Court noted that the Louisiana
legislature likely imposed the tax out of censorial motives, but the Court
did not restrict its holding to taxes imposed only from censorial motive. 3
Until the early 1980s Grosjean
was the only major case decided in this
4
taxation of the press area.1

7. See infra notes 8-32 and accompanying text (reviewing Supreme Court's prior taxation
of media cases); see also Todd F. Simon, All the News That's Fit to Tax: First Amendment
Limitations on State and Local Taxation of the Press, 21 WAKE FOREST L. REv 59, 68 (1985)
(stating Supreme Court's infrequency of addressing issue of constitutionality of taxation of
press). Simon stated that "[tlhe Supreme Court had not considered a challenge to a state tax
on first amendment grounds in almost forty-seven years." Id. (citation omitted). Grosjean v.
American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936), was the only major case decided on the issue until
the 1980s. Simon, supra, at 68 n.82.
8. See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 293, 245-49 (1936) (discussing history
of taxes on press or knowledge taxes); David L. Medford, Note, 13 OKLA. CrrY U. L. REv.
401, 403-05 (1988) (reviewing history of knowledge taxes prior to Grosjean). See generally
WILLIAM L. CHENEREY, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (providing background on free press and its
role in United States) (1955); LEONARD LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS (1985) (same).
9. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
10. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (holding that Louisiana tax
on newspaper advertising abridged freedom of press). The First Amendment was incorporated
into the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; therefore, its restrictions against
abridging press freedoms were applicable to the State of Louisiana. See Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (stating that "[tihe fundamental concept of liberty embodied in that
Amendment [14th] embraces the liberties as guaranteed by the First Amendment" (citation
omitted)).
11. Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 240.
12. Id.
13. See id. at 251 (noting that Louisiana tax was of suspicious nature and purposefully
penalized certain newspapers). The Grosjean Court noted that the Louisiana tax was suspicious
because "in the light of its history and of its present setting, it is seen to be a deliberate and
calculated device in the guise of a tax to limit the circulation of information." Id. at 250.
The Court observed that if the tax merely had "take[n] money from the pockets of the
[newspapers]" the result may have been different, but the Court did not answer that question.

Id.
See Simon, supra note 7, at 61 (noting that Louisiana legislature passed tax during Huey
Long's tenure as political boss as way of punishing Long's enemies). See generally T. HARRY
WILLIAMS, HuEY LONG (1969) (discussing Huey Long and his career).
14. See Simon, supra note 7, at 68 n.82 (noting that Grosjean was only taxation of press
case decided until 1980s). Another case of the Grosjean era addressed a crucial press question.
Cf. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (193t) (reviewing history of First Amendment and
holding that First Amendment was designed principally to protect press from censorship of
prior restraints).
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Then, in the 1983 landmark case of Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co.
v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue,'5 the Supreme Court ruled that a
Minnesota special use tax on paper and ink violated the principles of the
First Amendment.' 6 In Minneapolis Star, although the Court could detect
no evidence of censorial motive in the Minnesota legislation, the Court
found that singling out the press through differential treatment made the

Minnesota law unconstitutional.1 7 The suspicion of mere differential treatment articulated in Minneapolis Star was a new and sweeping First Amendment doctrine.' 8 Minneapolis Star created two categories in which state
taxation of the press may run afoul of the First Amendment. One arises
when a state singles out the press from other businesses and the other arises
when a state singles out and taxes only a few members of the press.' 9 The
Court acknowledged that while the press is not immune from a generally
applicable tax, the potential for abuse is present in differential taxation of
the press. 20 Justice Rehnquist dissented in Minneapolis Star, arguing that

15. 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
16. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575 (1983) (holding that Minnesota use tax on paper and ink imposed burden on press and
was unconstitutional).
17. Id. at 580, 591. The Minneapolis Star Court found that evidence of censorial motive
was not necessary to strike down a state statute that burdened the press unconstitutionally.
Id. at 585. The Court found Gros/ean not to be controlling. Id. at 580. The Court noted that
previous Supreme Court decisions had reached different interpretations of Grosjean with regard
to the issue of legislative censorial motive. Id. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,
384 (1968) (reasoning that legislative purpose was not relevant in Gros/ean). But see Houchins
v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 9 (1978) (hinting that legislative purpose was relevant in Grosjean).
18. See Jerry R. Parkinson, Comment, Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota
Commissioner of Revenue: Differential Taxation of the Press Violates the First Amendment,
69 IowA L. Rav. 1103, 1124 (1984) (observing that scope of decision in Minneapolis Star was
disturbingly wide and that court had pronounced "broad" and "unwarranted" rule).
19. See Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 592-93 (noting two grounds for holding tax
unconstitutional, singling out press and tailoring tax to single out few members of press);
Arkansas Writers Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 228 (1987) (noting two dangerous
distinctions in Minneapolis Star, singling out press and singling out few members of press);
Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438, 1443 (1991) (noting two possible reasons for tax
unconstitutionality, singling out press and singling out members of press, and focusing on
these reasons as penalty or burden on press).
20. See MinneapolisStar, 460 U.S. at 588 (observing that selection of press for differential
treatment threatens it with possibly burdensome treatment). In Minneapolis Star Justice
O'Connor noted, "We would be hesitant to fashion a rule that automatically allowed the State
to single out the press for a different method of taxation as long as the effective burden was
no different from that on other taxpayers or the burden on the press was lighter than that on
other businesses." Id. at 588. O'Connor continued, "One reason for this reluctance is that
the very selection of the press for special treatment threatens the press not only with the
current differential treatment, but with the possibility of subsequent differentially more
burdensome treatment." Id. O'Connor also stated that "we think that recognizing a power in
the State not only to single out the press but also to tailor the tax so that it singles out a few
members of the press presents such a potential for abuse that no interest suggested by
Minnesota can justify the scheme." Id. at 592 (emphasis added)..
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while unfavorable treatment violates the First Amendment, mere differential
21
treatment does not violate the First Amendment.
In 1987, the Supreme Court revisited the subject of taxation of the
media in Arkansas Writers Project v. Ragland.22 In Ragland, an Arkansas
gross receipts tax on sales of tangible personal property exempted from

taxation newspapers as well as religious, sports, trade, or professional
journals.23 The Court held that the Arkansas tax failed the second part of
the Minneapolis Star test, because the Arkansas statute singled out some

members of the press for taxation. 24 The Court also noted that the exemption
was content-based because it identified certain subjects that a periodical
could contain to qualify for an exemption.Y Because the Arkansas statute
was content-based, Justice Marshall's majority opinion in Ragland subjected
the tax to a strict scrutiny test that Arkansas failed to meet. 26

Justices Scalia and Rehnquist dissented in Ragland, arguing that instead
of applying a strict scrutiny test to the Arkansas tax at issue the majority

should have applied a rational basis test.2 7 The dissenters argued that under
a rational basis test the court would have upheld the tax.2 8 Justices Scalia

21. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575, 598-601 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (observing that only burdensome differential
taxation should be unconstitutional and arguing that Supreme Court is well-equipped to deal
with eventualities). In Minneapolis Star Rehnquist noted that "[t]he 'differential treatment'
standard that the Court has conjured up is unprecedented and unwarranted. To my knowledge
this Court has never subjected governmental action to the most stringent constitutional review
solely on the basis of 'differential treatment' of particular groups." Id. at 598. Justice Rehnquist
argued that "the Minnesota taxing scheme which singles out newspapers for 'differential
treatment' has benefited, not burdened" the freedom of the press. Id.
22. 481 U.S. 221 (1987).
23. See Arkansas Writers Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987) (holding that Arkansas
tax discriminated against small group of magazines and is content-based); ARK. CODE ANN. §
26-52-301(1) (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1989) (imposing tax on receipts from sale of tangible
personal property).
24. See Ragland, 481 U.S. at 229 (noting that Arkansas tax targets small group within
press). In Ragland, the Court held that because the tax was a generally imposed gross receipts
tax, there was no argument that it violated the first prong of the Minneapolis Star test, which
was singling out the press. Id.
25. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-52-401(14) (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1989) (exempting proceeds
of certain magazines based on content). The Arkansas statute exempted "[giross receipts of
gross proceeds derived from the sale of newspapers ... [r]eligious, professional, trade and
sports journals." Id. The Ragland Court observed that "this case involves a more disturbing
use of selective taxation than Minneapolis Star, because the basis on which Arkansas differentiates between magazines is particularly repugnant to First Amendment principles: a magazine's tax status depends entirely on its content." Ragland, 481 U.S. at 229.
26. See Simon, supra note 7, at 80-82 (explaining strict scrutiny test application in
taxation of media context).
27. See Ragland, 481 U.S. at 236-37 (Scalia, I., dissenting) (arguing that strict scrutiny
test is not appropriate for tax exemptions absent viewpoint discrimination). In Ragland, Scalia
and Rehnquist found the Arkansas tax met the rational basis test because it was "reasonably
related to the legitimate goals of encouraging small publishers. . .

."

Id. at 235.

28. See id. at 235-36 (observing that tax exemption was designed to avoid collection of
taxes where tax proceeds were less than administrative costs).
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and Rehnquist further contended that a denial of a tax exemption does not
implicate fundamental First Amendment rights. 29
Although the Ragland decision answered the question whether differential taxation among similar types of media is constitutional, the Supreme
Court intentionally left unanswered the issue whether different types of
media, newspapers and television for instance, could be subject to differential taxation. 30 Justice Marshall expressly refused to address this issue by
stating near the end of his opinion, "We need not decide whether a
distinction between different types of periodicals presents an additional basis
for invalidating the sales tax, as applied to the press."'" Four years later,
however, in Leathers v. Medlock the Supreme Court tackled Marshall's
2
unanswered question.1

II.

LEATHERS

Leathers developed from the 1987 Arkansas Sales Tax Act 188.11 The
state legislature adopted the Act that, for the first time, imposed a sales
tax on cable operators. 4 The Arkansas Code explicitly exempted newspapers
29. See id. at 236 (noting that state failure to subsidize fundamental right does not
amount to infringement of right). In Ragland Justice Scalia argues that the denial of an
exemption does not have a coercive effect on the media. Id. at 237. This dissent echoes some
of the same concerns that Justice Rehnquist voiced in Minneapolis Star. Minneapolis Star &
Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 597-600 (1983) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). But see Lionel S. Sobel, First Amendment Standards for Government Subsidies
of Artistic and Cultural Expression: A Reply to Justices Scalia and Rehnquist, 41 VAND. L.
REV. 517, 517-34 (1988) (criticizing Scalia position on tax exemptions and supporting Ragland
majority).
30. See Arkansas Writers Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 233 (1987) (finding that
resolution of case did not require answering question of differential tax between different
segments of media).
31. Id. at 233. Because the Ragland Court already had invalidated the discrimination
against magazines with certain content, it did not reach the next logical question of intermedia discrimination. Id.
32. See Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438, 1445 (1991) (answering question of
differential taxation among different media segments). The Leathers Court actually went
further than merely answering the question of taxing different kinds of media at different
levels; it restricted the holdings of the previous cases. Id. at 1443; see infra notes 48-53 and
accompanying text (discussing Leathers Court narrowing of prior taxation of media cases).
33. See ARx. CODE ANN. § 26-52-301, 26-52-302 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1989) (imposing
tax on sales receipts of all tangible personal property as well as some services). Arkansas first
enacted a sales tax in 1941 and first enacted a use tax in 1949. Brief for Petitioners at 3,
Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438 (1991) (No. 90-38). The current Arkansas sales tax rate
is four percent. Leathers, 111 S. Ct. at 1441.
34. 1987 ARK. Acrs 188. Act 188 imposed the sales tax on "cable television services
provided to subscribers or users. This shall include all service charges and rental charges
whether for basic service or premium channels or other special service, and shall include
installation and repair service charges and any other charges having any connection with the
providing of cable television services." Id. § 1. Arkansas joined a significant number of states
that tax cable services to some extent, including Connecticut, Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Nebraska, New Mexico, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, West Virginia,
and Wisconsin. See Dyk & Kulwicki, supra note 2, at 59 n.20 (describing variations of sales
tax imposed on cable services in different states).
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and magazines from the sales tax." The state legislature also excluded from
the sales tax scrambled satellite broadcasts, which the legislature did not
mention in the act and which the state tax authorities considered excluded.1
Some cable subscribers and cable operators brought suit against the State
37
of Arkansas alleging, among other claims, a First Amendment violation.
In 1987, before an Arkansas state trial court ruled on the challenge, the
Arkansas Legislature extended the sales tax to include scrambled satellite
broadcasts. 38 The Arkansas Supreme Court held that the initial sales tax on
cable television was unconstitutional between 1987 and 1989 because the
law discriminated between members of the same medium, namely cable
television and scrambled satellite broadcasts. 39 After the 1989 extension,
however, the Arkansas Supreme Court found the tax constitutional because
4
no bar existed against taxing different segments of the media differently. 0
Both the State Revenue Commissioner and the cable company and

subscribers decided to appeal the case to the United.States Supreme Court .4
On appeal, the State Revenue Commissioner argued that between 1987 and
1989 the sales tax was constitutional because of obvious differences between
cable television and scrambled satellite broadcasting and because the legis-

35. See Apu. CODE ANN. § 26-52-401 (exempting newspapers from gross receipts tax).
The Ragland decision judicially removed the distinction between different types of magazines.
Arkansas Writers Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 233 (1987). Although the result in Ragland
was not acknowledged in the statutes, it was not contested either, implying that all magazines
were exempt from the sales tax. Brief for Petitioners at 3, Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct.
1438 (1991) (No. 90-38).
36. See Brief for Petitioners at 3, Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438 (1991) (No. 9038) (noting that state considered scrambled satellite service exempt after 1987 Act). Scrambled
satellite services send signals directly to subscribers' satellite dishes. Id. See generally, ANTHONY
T. EASTON AND SusAN EASTON, TimE COMPLETE SOURCEBOOK OF HOME SATELLITE TV (1988)
(providing background information on types of satellite service).
37. See Leathers v. Medlock, Ill S. Ct. 1438, 1441 (1991) (describing cable petitioners'
appeal arguments). The plaintiffs in Leathers-a cable television subscriber, a cable operator,
and a trade association-also were alleging an equal protection violation under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id.
38. See 1989 Auc. AcTs 769 § 1 (expanding gross receipts tax to include scrambled
satellite broadcasts). The inclusion of scrambled satellite broadcasts made the sales tax equal
for members of the same segment of the media, in this case all video providers. Leathers, IIl
S. Ct. at 1441-42. Leathers then involved two different actions, the tax acts before the 1989
change, and the subsequent tax structure. Id. at 1442.
39. See Medock v. Pledger, 785 S.W.2d 202, 204 (Ark. 1990) (holding that satellite
broadcast service and cable television were substantially similar services and therefore must be
taxed at same rate), rev'd in part, aff'd in part sub nom. Leathers v. Medlock, III S. Ct.
1438 (1991). The Arkansas Court ruled that the Ragland decision applied in the present case
because from 1987 to 1989, cable television was subject to the tax and therefore similar services
were taxed differently. Id.
40. See id. at 204 (holding no Supreme Court precedent existed for invalidating differential tax on different segments of media). The Arkansas Supreme Court stated that "we are
unwilling to hold that all mass communications media must be taxed in the same way." Id.
41. See Leathers, I11 S. Ct. at 1442 (noting that both parties in state action sought
review in Supreme Court).
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lature was unaware of the nature of satellite broadcasting. 42 The opposing
cable company and subscribers asked for review on the issue of differential
taxation and argued that the distinction between cable television and other
media segments, such as newspapers, was unconstitutional.43 The cable
petitioners essentially asked that the Supreme Court take the final step it
did not take in Ragland and declare that all differential taxation of the
press presumptively is unconstitutional and subject to a strict scrutiny test.M
The Supreme Court first noted that the First Amendment protected
cable television. 45 Immediately after this clarification, however, the Court
stated that the fact that cable television is taxed differently from magazines
or newspapers standing alone did not raise First Amendment concerns.4 At
the outset, therefore, the Leathers Court answered the question left open
in Ragland and concluded that differential taxation of the press alone is
not inherently suspect under the First Amendment.4 7

42. See Brief for Appellant (State Revenue Commissioner) at 9, Leathers v. Medlock,
I11 S. Ct. 1438 (1991) (No. 90-29) (arguing that cable television was distinct from other
satellite television service because it used public air waves to provide service and because
Arkansas Legislature was unaware of receipt producing satellite service). The argument that
cable television's use of public air waves was significant was rejected by the Arkansas Supreme
Court. Medlock, 785 S.W.2d at 203. The United States Supreme Court did not need to address
either argument because the Court found that the State could tax even similar media members
differently. Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S.Ct. 1438, 1445 (1991).
43. See Brief for Petitioners (cable company and subscribers) at 4-5, Leathers v. Medlock,
IlIS. Ct. 1438 (1991) (No. 90-38) (asking Supreme Court to declare singling out of cable
television for gross receipts tax unconstitutional).
44. See id. at 20-21 (asking Supreme Court to allow cable television to enjoy same First
Amendment protection on taxation issues as other segments of mass communication media).
45. See Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S.Ct. 1438, 1442 (1991) (describing services provided
by cable television). The Leathers Court noted that cable television was involved in speech
and was a member of the press. Id. See PATRICK PARsoNS, CABLE TELEVISION AND THE FIRsT
AmENmENT 29-48 (1987) (providing background on cable television and its place in First
Amendment); GEORGE H. SHmAPo, CABLESPEEca 1-206 (1983) (same); Christine Gasser, Note,
Cable Television: A New Challenge For the "Old" First Amendment, 60 ST. JOHN'S L. Ray.
114, 139-43 (1985) (analyzing cable television through First Amendment); see also Los Angeles
v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494-95 (1986) (holding that cable companies'
programming and communicating plainly implicated First Amendment). Although cable television is subject to regulation at greater levels than more traditional members of the media,
this does not change the fact that cable is part of the press. Id. Justice Blackmun, however,
concurring in Preferred Communications, noted that "[d]ifferent communications media are
treated differently for First Amendment purposes." Id. at 496.
46. Leathers, 111 S.Ct. at 1442.
47. Id. at 1442. It is interesting that at the beginning of the opinion, the Leathers Court
asserts that differential taxation did not raise First Amendment concerns alone, without citing
any case law. Id. See Brief for Petitioner (cable company and subscribers) at 20-22, Leathers
v. Medlock, IlIS. Ct. 1438 (1991) (No. 90-38) (demonstrating that cable petitioners certainly
did not view this question in such straightforward manner). The cable petitioners pointed out
that many state courts had concluded that all differential taxation between members of the
media was subject to strict scrutiny. Id. It would seem that the open question from Ragland
warranted a quick and simple answer from the Supreme Court. Leathers, 111 S.Ct. at 1442.
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A review of Minneapolis Star and Ragland reveals that the Leathers
Court framed those cases to allow the Court to change its standard on

taxation of the media without explicitly rejecting its own precedents. 4 The
Leathers Court stated, "These cases demonstrate that differential taxation
of First Amendment speakers is constitutionally suspect when it threatens
to suppress the expression of particular ideas or viewpoints." '49 Justice

O'Connor, the author of the majority opinion, went beyond merely allowing
taxation on different segments of the media and answering the Ragland
question of the constitutionality of differential taxation.50 Justice O'Connor
set up a fundamentally new test, in which the courts analyze taxation of
the media with less scrutiny. 5' Under this new test, even the distinction
between cable television and satellite broadcasts in the Arkansas Statute is
permissible.5 2 In the future, the real problem would arise if evidence of

48. See Dyk & KuIwicki, supra note 2, at 54 (noting that Leathers decision has substantially limited Supreme Court's earlier taxation of press decisions). Dyk and Kuiwicki also note
that Justice O'Connor, who authored Minneapolis Star as well as Leathers, tried to reconcile
these two decisions. Id. at 56. It is not unusual for the Supreme Court to limit previous cases
to their facts without explicitly overruling them. Cf. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs.,
492 U.S. 490 (1989) (limiting sharply protections of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), while
still adhering to prior decision in principle).
49. See Leathers, 111 S. Ct. at 1443 (redefining Minneapolis Star and Ragland). It is
not at all clear that Ragland and Minneapolis Star were limited to the concept that viewpoint
discrimination was the focus of the Court's examination of taxation of the press. See Arkansas
Writers Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 230 (1987) (noting that selective taxation does not
avoid First Amendment difficulties merely because no burden on expression of viewpoint
exists). In fact, in Ragland, Justice Marshall speaks much more broadly. Id.
See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575,
592 (1983) (expressing concern about potential for abuse from taxation). One should note that
Justice O'Connor also authored the Leathers opinion. Leathers, 111 S. Ct. at 1440.
See Richard A. Cordray & James T. Vradelis, Comment, The Emerging Jurisprudence
of Justice O'Connor, 52 U. Cm. L. Rav. 389, 451-52 (1985) (reviewing Justice O'Connor's
jurisprudence and noting that O'Connor was most concerned with purpose for First Amendment
protection of newspapers). It seems that Justice O'Connor underwent a shift between Minneapolis Star and Leathers in viewing the First Amendment as more concerned with viewpoint
censorship and less with mere content distinction. Leathers, 111 S. Ct. at 1443-44. Justice
O'Connor adopted much of the argument from Justice Scalia's dissent in Ragland. See
Ragland, 481 U.S. at 235.
50. See Leathers v. Medlock, III S. Ct. 1438, 1442 (1991) (answering Ragland question
of differential taxation between different segments of media). The Leathers Court had no
choice but to answer the differential taxation question head on because it was faced with a
clear tax differential between two different kinds of media members, cable television and
magazines/newspapers. Id. at 1441.
51. See id. at 1445 (asserting that previous cases provide no support to idea that
discrimination within medium violates First Amendment without evidence of viewpoint discrimination). Although the Leathers Court speaks about the special role of the press in the
United States, the Court attributes no special treatment to the press, subjecting the Arkansas
statute to a less heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment. Id. Unless the media member
can show one of three specific types of discrimination, a compelling interest test will not be
required. Id. See infra notes 137-66 and accompanying text (discussing requirements to fall
into three areas of media protection articulated in Leathers).
52. See Leathers, 111 S. Ct. at 1447 (concluding that Arkansas tax on either cable
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censorship or, in Justice O'Connor's words, viewpoint discrimination is

present, and hence the media's need for First Amendment protection increases.

53

Despite the Leathers Court's departure from the Minneapolis Star and4
Ragland standard, the Court did not totally abandon previous doctrine .
Three forms of protection remain that provide the media with some protection from discriminatory taxation. 5 A state that singles out the press for
a special tax, as Minnesota did with its special use tax, implicates the first
protection.16 The second protection arises when a tax singles out a small
number of speakers or members of the media.17 Finally, a state could risk

television alone or cable television and satellite broadcasts is permissible under First Amendment). Under Ragland differential taxation between similar media members was impermissible,
and the Arkansas Supreme Court ruled that scrambled satellite broadcasting and cable were
substantially similar. Medlock v. Pledger, 785 S.W.2d 202, 204 (Ark. 1990), rev'd in part,
aff'd in part sub nom. Leathers v. Medlock, I11 S. Ct. 1438 (1991). Ragland held that a tax
exemption for only some magazines was unconstitutional. Ragland, 481 U.S. at 229. Leathers
now holds that an exemption for some television services and not others is constitutional.
Leathers, 111 S. Ct. at 1447. Justice Marshall's dissent questions whether the previous nondiscrimination principle survives Leathers. Id. at 1452.
53. See Leathers, 111 S. Ct. at 1443 (arguing that only threat of viewpoint suppression
makes tax constitutionally suspect under First Amendment). The Leathers analysis is similar
to Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Minneapolis Star because legislation that benefits the media
likely would not be evidence of censorship under the Leathers approach. Minneapolis Star &
Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 601-02 (1983). No longer does
a concern exist with the potential for abuse; now the concern is with viewpoint discrimination.
See Leathers, 111 S. Ct. at 1443-45 (discussing possible abuses of media and stressing importance
of viewpoint discrimination when reviewing tax).
54. See infra notes 137-66 and accompanying text (discussing protections of media under
Leathers).
55. See Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438, 1443-44 (1991) (mentioning three areas
of discrimination where Supreme Court will apply strict scrutiny). If none of the three areas
mentioned in Leathers is applicable, the complaining media member would need to show an
"additional basis" for striking down the state statute. Id. at 1445. Because neither singling
out the press, singling out a small number of media members, or content-based discrimination
is present in the Arkansas statute, the facts of Leathers do not trigger heightened or strict
scrutiny. Id. at 1444.
See infra notes 137-66 and accompanying text (discussing three areas of protection in
detail). Although a first reading of Leathersappears to give the impression that state legislatures
are free to tax the media with impunity, these three areas have a substantial amount of force
and should provide necessary protection for the media against legislative censorial motives.
Leathers, 111 S. Ct. at 1444.
56. See Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 582 (noting that Minnesota tax was unique in
creating special tax for media). The Minneapolis Star Court noted that singling out the press
would pose increased danger because a legislature would be able to tax the media without
having to burden other businesses or people. Id. at 585. Apparent safety exists in a gross
receipts tax or a generally applicable sales tax. Id. See Randall P. Bezanson, Political
Agnosticism, EditorialFreedom, and Government Neutrality Toward the Press: Observations
on Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, 72 IowA L.
Rav. 1359, 1367-69 (1987) (discussing elements of Supreme Court's rule on singling out press).
57. See Arkansas Writers Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 229 (1987) (noting that few
Arkansas magazines paid sales tax). Singling out small groups of the press was a problem in
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a constitutional challenge if the state resorts to content to differentiate
between members of the media.58 This last protection requires a definition
of different types of content-based language and is difficult to clarify. 9
Because the Arkansas tax in question in Leathers violated none of these
°
areas, the Court did not subject it to strict judicial scrutiny.6
The Court went on to address the cable petitioner's argument that even
when no intent to suppress ideas is evident, differential taxation between
members of the media violates the First Amendment. 6' The Supreme Court
rejected this argument on differential taxation, and in rejecting the argument
the Court relied on Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington.62
In Regan, the Court decided that an extension of a tax exemption to one
group of taxpayers and not to others does not trigger strict scrutiny analysis
under the First Amendment.63 Justice O'Connor noted that Regan stands
Ragland. Id. Justice Marshall's dissent in Leathers pointed out that difficultly existed in
quantifying the actual number of members which would qualify as a small group; after Ragland
it is apparent that three or four qualifies as a small enough group. Leathers, Ill S. Ct. at
1444. Singling out a small group also was a problem for the Court in Minneapolis Star due
to the small number of newspapers who paid use tax. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v.
Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 591 (1983).
58. See Ragland, 481 U.S. at 229 (noting that content is particularly disturbing basis of
selective taxation); infra notes 157-66 and accompanying text (discussing content-based discrimination more fully); see also Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content:
The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. Cm. L. REv. 81, 83-84 (1978)
(providing general background on content-based classifications and discussing standards and
nature of content review). Stone divides content-based classifications into subject-matter and
viewpoint. Id. Some confusion exists about the distinction between general content-based
distinctions and more specific viewpoint-based distinctions. Justice O'Connor in Leathers
expresses concern about censorship which implies viewpoint distinctions. Leathers, 111 S. Ct.
at 1444. Justice Marshall in Ragland wrote that any content-based restriction is a problem.
Ragland, 481 U.S. at 229. The post-Leathers era will be clearly morerestrictive in interpreting
content.
59. See infra notes 157-66 and accompanying text (attempting to explain shifting definition
of content in context of taxation of press).
60. See Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438, 1445 (1991) (observing that Arkansas tax
at issue presented no problems of censorial motive or viewpoint discrimination).
61. See id. (examining existence of any additional basis on which to strike down Arkansas
tax).
62. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
63. See Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540 (1983)
(holding tax exemption for veterans' organization that engages in lobbying is constitutional
although other organizations that engage in lobbying are not exempt). In Regan the Supreme
Court considered a tax exemption for nonprofit groups which did not engage in lobbying
activities. Id. at 542. The Regan Court also examined the fact that veterans' groups were tax
exempt even though they engaged in lobbying activities. Id. at 546. The Regan Court found
that a tax exemption merely was a form of subsidy. Id. at 543. Citing Cammarano v. United
States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959), the Regan Court reasoned that Congress was not required by the
First Amendment to subsidize rights such as lobbying. Regan, 461 U.S. at 546. The Regan
Court also held that the exception made for veterans' groups was rational and a legitimate
exercise of the government's taxing powers. Id. at 547. Finally, the Regan Court noted that
the outcome might have been different if the tax subsidies were aimed at suppressing dangerous
ideas or viewpoints. Id. at 548. Therefore, the Regan Court found the tax exemption
constitutional. Id. at 551.
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for the proposition that a tax statute discriminating among different speakers
only implicates the First Amendment if discrimination on the basis of ideas
is present. 64 The adoption of this rule is quite similar to Justice Scalia's
argument in dissent in Ragland.61 Scalia argued that the Court should not
use strict scrutiny to analyze a tax that merely discriminated among types
of speakers, while the Court should use the higher standard to look at a
tax that discriminated among viewpoints. 66
Justice 0 'Connor, in her Leathers opinion, went on to add more
support to the distinction between mere differential taxation and viewpoint
discrimination taxation. 67 O'Connor cited Mabee v. White PlainsPublishing
Co. 6 and Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling69 for the contention
that government action placing differential burdens on members of the press
does not necessarily violate the First Amendment. 70 Both Mabee and Walling
underscored the point that even when the Court places differential burdens
on the press, some kind of suppression of ideas is necessary to trigger
heightened scrutiny.7' Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Leathers ended

64. See Leathers, I11 S. Ct. at 1445-46 (reviewing Regan and its reliance on viewpoint
discrimination).
65. See Arkansas Writers Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 236-37 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that use of strict scrutiny standard for denial of tax exemption is wrong
because denial has no coercive effect).
66. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Regan, 461 U.S. at 549 for proposition that
subsidies are not subject to strict scrutiny). Justice Scalia noted that "Our opinions have long
recognized-in First Amendment contexts as elsewhere-the reality that tax exemptions, credits,
and deductions are 'a form of subsidy that is administered through the tax system,' and the
general rule that 'a legislature's decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right
does not infringe the right, and thus is not subject to strict scrutiny."' Ragland, 481 U.S. at
236. Justice Scalia also stated a point almost identical to Justice O'Connor's in Leathers,
saying, "Perhaps a more stringent, prophylactic rule is appropriate, and can consistently be
applied, when the subsidy pertains to the expression of a particular viewpoint.... ." Id. at
237.
67. See Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438, 1446 (1991) (noting that differential
burden on speakers alone does not raise First Amendment concerns).
68. 327 U.S. 178 (1946).
69. 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
70. See Leathers, I11 S. Ct. at 1446-47 (citing cases to support Leathers emphasis on
viewpoint discrimination and not mere differential burdens). Mabee and Walling both dealt
with regulation, not taxation, but they still serve as compelling support for Leathers. Id.
71. See Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U.S. 178 (1946) (holding that Fair
Labor Standards Act did apply to New York State newspaper and observing that suppression
of ideas is necessary to trigger heightened scrutiny). In Mabee, a White Plains newspaper
challenged the Fair Labor Standards Act because it granted exemptions for small weekly and
semi-weekly newspapers. Id. at 184. According to the Mabee Court the exemption was designed
to put small newspapers on equal footing with other small town enterprises. Id. The fact that
the statute made distinctions between large and small newspapers was not dispositive. Id. The
Mabee Court recognized that the exemption was not trying to penalize a group of newspapers,
or lay a special tax on the press in violation of the First Amendment. Id. Finally the Mabee
Court found this exemption to be a proper application of the Commerce Power of Congress.
Id. The Mabee Court did note that the press had no special immunity from general laws or
regulations directed at businesses. Id. Consequently, the Court upheld the Fair Labor Standards
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by stating that the Arkansas decision to exclude certain media7 2members
from taxation did not implicate or violate the First Amendment.
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Blackmun, dissented in Leathers.73
Marshall largely reemphasized his Ragland opinion. 74 Besides rejecting the
majority's new test, Marshall particularly was bothered by the majority's
emphasis on censorial motive. 7 Marshall rejected the majority's reliance on
Regan and also argued that by focusing on narrow viewpoint-based discrimination the majority opinion destroyed the nondiscrimination principle under
the First Amendment.7 6 Marshall concluded that although legislatures should
not give the press special treatment, differential taxation is presumptively
invidious and should be subjected to a strict scrutiny test. 77 In Marshall's
view the Arkansas tax did not meet the strict scrutiny test. 78 Representing
the
the former method of analysis, the Marshall opinion demonstrates
79
Court's significant change in analysis from the Ragland decision.
III. ANALYsis oF Leathers Result
Leathers was both a necessary change from previous standards and a

good result in its own right.80 The previous test, set up by Minneapolis Star
Act as applied to the newspapers. Id. at 184-85.
See Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946) (holding wages and
hours provisions of Fair Labor Standards Act applicable to newspapers). In Walling, the
Supreme Court considered the application of a portion of the Fair Labor Standards Act
dealing with wages and hours to newspapers. Id. at 189. The Walling Court held that the
newspapers were not immune from government regulation of labor standards. Id. at 193.
Although the newspaper had argued that First Amendment concerns made the enforcement
impossible, the Walling Court dismissed this claim. Id. The exemption of small newspapers
was also upheld by the Walling Court because the regulations did not single out the press, it
applied to all larger businesses. Id. at 194. The Walling Court concluded that the small
newspapers were exempted to place them on an equal footing with other small businesses. Id.
Consequently, the Walling Court upheld the application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to
newspapers against the First Amendment challenge. Id.
72. Leathers v. Mediock, Ill S. Ct. 1438, 1447 (1991).
73. Id.
74. See Leathers, I11 S. Ct. at 1447 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing differential
taxation of press should be unconstitutional between members of same media); Arkansas
Writers Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987) (holding differential taxation of press
unconstitutional between members of same media).
75. See Leathers, Ill S. Ct. at 1452 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (rejecting emphasis on
censorial motive and supporting potential for abuse test of Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co.
v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983)).
76. Id. at 1452-53.
77. Id. at 1450.
78. Id. at 1453.
79. See id. at 1454 (observing that Supreme Court "unwisely" has thrown out prior
teachings). In Leathers Marshall's dissent complains that "the majority so adamantly proclaims
the irrelevance of this problem (equal treatment for the media) that its analysis calls into
question whether any general obligation to treat media actors even-handedly survives today's
decision." Id. at 1447-48. Marshall admits that the Leathers decision is a cutting back on
"selective-taxation precedents," and in his opinion that move is unwise. Id. at 1448.
80. See Medford, supra note 8, at 431 (observing that Ragland standard is of questionable
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and Ragland, was neither practical nor sensible.8 ' Instead of approaching
the taxation of the press issue cautiously, the Supreme Court developed a
test to examine differential taxation of the press that swept too broadly. 82
Furthermore, the Court leapt from protecting newspapers against purposeful

suppression of speech in Grosjean to disapproving of multiple variations of
state taxing schemes in Minneapolis Star.83 Although the Leathers test is' a
strong, effective result, one way exists in which the Leathers test can be
improved 4 The modification, a heightened rational basis test, will make
85
the Leathers protections stronger.
The Minneapolis Star test essentially held that any differential taxation
was inherently suspect and, therefore, subject to strict scrutiny review.8 6
This put a heavy burden on states to justify parts of their taxation schemes,
although in years past states had broad leeway to tax.8 7 Minneapolis Star

effectiveness). Medford observed that Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r
of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983), and Arkansas Writers Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221
(1987), ended up hurting the media because state legislatures were unable to tax media at
lower levels than other businesses. Id. Therefore, the coercive effect on the media would be
greater because states could tax the media fully under generally applicable sales taxes. Id. The
result of Minneapolis Star and Ragland was counterproductive. Id.
See Simon, supra note 7, at 73 (describing flaws in Supreme Court's Minneapolis Star
test). Simon noted that the Court's failure to distinguish between the press as informationgatherer and the press as a business was a "fatal flaw." Id. The Minneapolis Star decision
disrupted state systems of exemptions and preferences. Id. at 73-74. Even preferences for First
Amendment activities would be disallowed, to the detriment of diversity. Id. at 74.
81. See Simon, supra note 7, at 75 (discussing negative results of Minneapolis Star test).
The Supreme Court adopted the Minneapolis Star test without really considering the effects.
Id. at 75-76. No evidence of harm to the media existed to warrant a per se rule that differential
treatment should be inherently suspect. Id. at 76. See Medford, supra note 8, at 431 (criticizing
Ragland for being counterproductive).
See supra note 49 and accompanying text (discussing O'Connor shift in opinion from
Minneapolis Star to Leathers). One should note the way the Leathers Court retreated from
the Minneapolis Star standard even though Justice O'Connor wrote both opinions. Id.
82. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575, 591-92 (1983) (setting up potential for abuse test). Minneapolis Star tried to deter all
taxes that had the potential for abuse but the vague scope of the opinion merely got the Court
into more efforts to define the test. Id.
See infra notes 86-98 and accompanying text (reviewing criticism of Ragland and Minneapolis Star).
83. See Medford, supra note 8, at 415 (examining Supreme Court's leap in taxation of
press issue from Gros/ean to Minneapolis Star); see also Simon, supra note 7, at 73-74 (noting
that many state tax codes had exemptions and preferences and havoc would be played on
state systems).
84. See infra notes 167-76 and accompanying text (suggesting improvements in Leathers
standard).
85. See infra notes 167-76 and accompanying text (suggesting Leathers test would be
stronger if states were required to provide serious justifications for differential taxation).
86. See Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 591 (stating potential for abuse test that made
differential taxation suspect); Simon, supra note 7, at 70 (observing very fact of differential
taxation was violation in Minneapolis Star).
87. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575, 599 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that broad discretion in taxation matters
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adopted parts of the First Amendment Speech Clause analysis and mixed
those with the Grosjean Court's holding to create a new and far-reaching
concept that the press is special and cannot be subject to differential
taxation. 8 The Minneapolis Star Court, however, did not define precisely
the scope of differential taxation, thus leaving this definition to later courts. 89

The Minneapolis Star Court seemed determined to use a broad sweep to
protect against the potential for abuse. 90 No evidence existed, however, that
differential taxation actually harmed the media or that the states harbored

any intent to discriminate.9 1 Thus, there was no need to protect the media
from theoretical harms that did not exist, namely burdensome discriminatory

taxation.2
Years later the Ragland Court took the broad Minneapolis Star test

and made it even more sweeping.93 Justice Marshall decided that because
of its invidious nature, all content-based discrimination between members

are traditionally accorded to states); see also Simon, supra note 7, at 71 n.l 17 (stating general
rule that states may tailor tax system as they wish). States had heavy burden under strict
scrutiny test to justify their state tax systems in Minneapolis Star. Id. at 73.
88. See generally Potter Stewart, "Or Of the Press," 26 HASTINGS L. J. 631 (1975)
(discussing concept of press having special status in First Amendment); see also Simon, supra
note 7, at 73 (noting that Minneapolis Star took special status concept and applied to press
as business). The Minneapolis Star Court twisted Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S.
233 (1936), out of its context. Simon, supra note 7, at 73. Minneapolis Star applied First
Amendment theory out of its usual context. Id. at 74.
89. See Arkansas Writers Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 229-31 (1987) (defining
differential taxation in terms of singling out press members); Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct.
1438, 1443 (1991) (defining differential taxation in terms of censorship).
90. See Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 592 (defining potential for abuse as singling out
press or few members of press).
See Bezanson, supra note 56, at 1374 (observing broad scope of Minneapolis Stardecision).
Bezanson noted that the Court's decision revealed an interest in the general relation between
the media and the political system. Id. at 1375. This broad interest is perhaps a way to explain
the scope of Minneapolis Star. Id.
91. See Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 580-81 (noting that no censorial motive was found
in Minnesota Legislature but none was needed for Court's invalidation of tax). But cf.
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that in Equal Protection challenges to
racial discrimination, intent, not merely disproportionate impact, must be shown on part of
state).
92. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575, 596 (1983) (White, J., concurring) (noting that Minnesota tax clearly benefitted press and
no reason existed for tax to be struck down on those grounds); see also id. at 598-600
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that no harm existed and Minnesota tax posed no abridgement of press freedom). Justice Rehnquist argues in his dissent that the Supreme Court was
capable of reviewing future tax schemes and looking for infringements of rights as well as
actual abuses. Id. at 601. Justice Rehnquist found no reason for the Court to rely on the
potential for abuse test when the press was benefitted. Id. at 600. See Simon, supra note 7,
at 76 (arguing there is no need to prevent danger of abuse that does not exist).
93. See Medford, supra note 8, at 430-31 (observing that scope of protection for press
has been continually enlarged). But see Bezanson, supra note 56, at 1360 (asserting that
Ragland actually limited holding of Minneapolis Star).
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of the media violated the First Amendment. 4 Because Justice Marshall
applied the strict, scrutiny test to the Arkansas law, the State of Arkansas
could not show that its goals of encouraging fledgling publishers or raising
revenue were rational because the State could not demonstrate a compelling
interest. 95 However, Justice Marshall's failure to make any distinction between general content-based or subject-matter discrimination and more
specific viewpoint-based discrimination further muddled the taxation of the
press issue.9 It is clear from Marshall's Leathers dissent that he made no
distinction between the two types of discrimination because he believes that
any differential taxation, regardless of legislative intent or motive, is violative
of the First Amendment." The definition of content for Justice Marshall
virtually is a euphemism for any differentiation between media members. 9s
Under this pre-Leathers application of the strict scrutiny test to taxation
of the press, the Supreme Court was moving toward requiring equal taxation
for all members of the media. 99 But 'for the Leathers decision, the use of
the strict scrutiny test in this context additionally would have required the
Court to define who qualified as a member of the media; a job made
especially difficult by many new emerging technologies. 10° Accordingly, strict

94. See Arkansas Writers Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 229 (1987) (discussing
disturbing use of content-based discrimination). In Ragland, Justice Marshall cites Police Dept.
of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), to support the proposition that content discrimination
is disfavored. Ragland, 481 U.S. at 229-30.
95. See Ragland,481 U.S. at 231-32 (rejecting state justifications for differential taxation);
Id. at 235 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing legitimate state goals of revenue and encouraging
new publications). Scalia argues that differential taxation was reasonably related to the goals
of encouraging small publishers, raising revenue, and crafting an administratively sensible tax.
Id. at 235-36.
96. See infra notes 157-66 (discussing Leathersdefinition of content in terms of viewpoint
discrimination); see also Medford, supra note 8, at 421-22 (noting that Justice Marshall's
comparison of Mosely to Ragland is unfair because one case is legislative prohibition on
expression and other is general sales tax with content definition). The Mosely court held that
a statute which banned picketing within 150 feet of a school, unless the school was involved
in a labor dispute, was an unconstitutional prohibition of messages based on subject matter.
Mosely, 408 U.S. at 95.
97. See Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438, 1448-49 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(finding that principle of nondiscrimination compelled striking down Arkansas tax).
98. See Ragland, 481 U.S. at 230 (noting that merely because state does not discriminati
between viewpoints does not necessarily avoid First Amendment problems).
99. See Brief for Petitioners at 20-21, Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438 (1991) (No.
90-38) (requesting Supreme Court to take final step and hold intermedia differential taxation
presumptively unconstitutional); see also Simon, supra note 7, at 74 (observing that equal
taxation for all members of media would be logical outcome of Ragland reasoning combined
with potential for abuse discussion in Minneapolis Star); see also supra notes 86-98 and
accompanying text (discussing taxation of press test developed from Ragland and Minneapolis
Star).
100. See City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494
(1986) (discussing integration of cable television into First' Amendment). The Preferred Communications Court spoke of cable television "implicating" First Amendment interests. Id.
PreferredCommunicationsdemonstrates the Supreme Court's discomfort with finding a balance
with the First Amendment. Id. The Supreme Court would have had to deal with this question
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scrutiny would have forced the Supreme Court to define specifically contentbased discrimination under the broad Marshall standard in Ragland.'0' The
test would have left states without flexibility for taxation-an essential
element of an effective tax structure. 02 In other words, states would be
unable to give tax exemptions to minority broadcasters, new or small
publications, or other media outlets that otherwise could flourish under
favorable tax treatment. 03 If a state did exempt some of these publications,
the law would force the state to exempt larger broadcast stations and
magazines or to eliminate all.exemptions.' °4 Put simply, the Ragland standard would have put state governments in a straight jacket. 05 As the
Supreme Court considered Leathers, therefore, they were confronted with
the opportunity to take the last fateful step toward uniform taxation of the
press, and the Court wisely declined to take that step.' °6 Instead the Court
chose to veer away from the previous test.'0 7 The Supreme Court developed
a new test allowing states flexibility while still giving the media necessary
protection.10
of how to define the media if the Ragland standard had been extended to ban all intermedia
discrimination, because no member of the media could have been taxed any differently than
another. Ragland, 481 U.S. at 233.
Leathers engaged in a short test to see if cable television was part of the press. Leathers,
III S. Ct. at 1442. The Court used a standard of providing "news, information, and
entertainment." Id. How other new technologies, such as data bases, would have fit into this
definition is unclear.
101. See Arkansas Writers Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 230 (1987) (defining content
in terms broader than viewpoint discrimination).
102. See Simon, supra note 7, at 71 n.117 (discussing broad flexibility states are accorded
with regards to tax structure); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of
Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 599 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that state legislatures
are accorded great deference in setting up tax structures).
103. See Ragland, 481 U.S. at 235-36 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing state justifications
of Arkansas tax structure); see also Simon, supra note 7, at 87-89 (discussing various differential
tax structures within media and their usefulness). In addition to Arkansas' stated justifications,
another useful exemption is one exempting newspapers from sales tax so that people can have
easy access to information. Id. at 87. Some states exempt motion picture film or videotape.
Id. at 89.
104. See Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 604 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that
newspapers might be subject to millions in taxes because states will be forced to remove all
exemptions).
105. See Simon, supra note 7, at 74 (observing that only daring legislatures would try to
promote one member of media without promoting others). This drawback of the Ragland
standard would have removed all flexibility and most legislatures would respond by doing
nothing. Id.
See Case Note, Arkansas Tax Exemption Structure Imposes an UnconstitutionalBurden
on The Press, 65 U. DEr. L. Rnv. 871, 879-82 (1988) (criticizing use of strict scrutiny test in
Ragland).
106. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text (noting Leathers Court declining to
adopt taxation of media approach that prohibited all differential taxation).
107. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text (noting that Supreme Court created
fundamentally new test that drew back from broad approach of Ragland and Minneapolis
Star).
108. See Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438, 1444 (1991) (describing new test for
taxation of media and remaining protections).
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Contrary to the beliefs of members of the media, many state tax
structures actually benefit members of the media by treating them differently
from bQth each other and other businesses.109 The media is unharmed by
taxation that applies generally to all businesses." 0 Additionally, no reason
exists why a tax that benefits the press should be unconstitutional under
the First Amendment."' Accordingly, Leathers focused on the real harm to
the media-censorship." 2 Members of the media are protected against
censorship and unfair treatment."' The First Amendment only prohibits
abridgement of freedom of 4the press, not legislative assistance supporting
information dissemination."
Aside from sound constitutional grounds for the Leathers decision,
additional reasons exist to support this new standatd." 5 From a public
policy standpoint, the new Leathers test takes a sensible look at the taxation
of the press issue. ' 6 In addition to the obvious revenue-raising motivations,
the practical goal of many legislatures is to give tax exemptions to certain

109. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575, 598 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (concluding that MWNAPoLis STAR & TuamaN paid
less taxes under special use tax than under generally applicable tax). Newspapers were benefitted
by being treated differently than other businesses. Id. Even though this Minnesota special use
tax structure violated the First Amendment under the Leathers standard, differential taxation
can be beneficial for the media. See Leathers, Ill S. Ct. at 1444 (retaining basic holding of
MinneapolisStar that singling out press violates First Amendment). Although Leathers retained
the Minneapolis Star holding, under the reasoning of the Leathers approach, one could argue
that a special use tax would only be unconstitutional if it burdened the media more than a
generally applicable tax. Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 598.
110. See Leathers, 111 S. Ct. at 1444 (noting general applicability of Arkansas tax to all
businesses). Because the Arkansas tax applied to all business generally, the role of the press
as a watchdog was not hindered. Id. See Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 600 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (noting that First Amendment prohibits abridging freedom of press, not assisting
freedom of press).
111. See Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 596 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that First
Amendment protects press from abridging of press freedoms). Rehnquist notes that the majority
in MinneapolisStar finds the use tax unconstitutional even though the press freedom involved
was neither diminished nor curtailed. Id.
112. See Leathers, 111 S. Ct. at 1443 (observing that censorship is focus of Court's
examination and censorship is real danger to media).
113. See infra notes 137-66 and accompanying text (discussing three Leathers protections
of singling out press, taxing small number of press, and content/viewpoint based distinctions).
114. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575, 600 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (denying that First Amendment prohibits Congress
from supporting information dissemination). But see id. at 583 (reasoning by majority that
differential taxation of press would have troubled First Amendment framers). Justice O'Connor
observed that the proponents of the Constitution believed that Congress had no power to
control the press. Id. at 584. O'Connor continued that the mere power to tax differentially
can operate as a threat of burdensome taxation. Id. at 585.
115. See infra notes 116-30 and accompanying text (discussing public policy support for
Leathers).
116. See Arkansas Writers Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 237 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (observing that banning differential taxation casts doubt on many tax preferences
and was realistically impossible).
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members of the media to increase dissemination of information to the
public." 7 Legislatures try to encourage new publishers and new technologies." 8 Encouraging new publications can be an effective means of increasing
the dissemination of information and can also expand the available spectrum
of views." 9 States also use their tax statutes to raise needed revenue for
public expenditures. 20 The bottom line is that differential taxation may
further many goals of taxation.' 2'
States also need to ensure that their tax collection is administratively
sensible.'2 For instance, if the law forces a state to tax all members of the
media equally, the state might have to collect one cent on a newspaper
purchased on the street, inconveniencing both consumers, who would be
forced to pay twenty-six cents instead of twenty-five cents for a newspaper,
and publishers, who would have to collect the tax revenue from a multitude
of sources.'2 By giving states flexibility under Leathers, the Court allowed
the state to make creative, sensible and fair tax policy, such as exempting
small fledgling publications or emerging new technologies. 2 4 From a policy

117. See Don Lively, Affirmative Action and A Free Press: Policies and Problems in
Promoting the First Amendment, 65 PAC. L.J. 85, 92-94 (1979) (supporting concept of
governmental support for new forms of media).
118. See Lively, supra note 117, at 92 (observing that assisting new forms of media would
increase intermedia competition and further diversity); see also supra note 95 and accompanying
text (discussing Arkansas' justification for tax scheme in Ragland).
119. See infra notes 127-30 and accompanying text (discussing Miami Herald Publishing
Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), and role of diversity in First Amendment). Tornillo
rejected the argument that increasing dissemination of information was enough to justify a
mandatory right of access. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 254. However, the Supreme Court gave the
argument credibility and Chief Justice Burger credited the diversity view of the First Amendment
with much accuracy. Id. at 247-53. The Supreme Court acknowledged that power in the media
had been placed in very few hands. Id. at 250.
120. See Ragland, 481 U.S. at 231 (noting Arkansas Revenue Commissioner's defense of
tax by asserting state's interest in raising revenue). The Ragland Court acknowledged the
revenue raising interest as "important." Id. However, the Court concluded, revenue raising
did not justify differential taxation. Id.
121. See supra notes 116-26 (discussing policy support for Leathers); Times Mirror Co.
v. City of Los Angeles, 192 Cal. App. 3d 170, 183 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (noting that state
power to classify differently for tax purposes is broad). The Times Mirror court observed that
classifications and distinctions are rational and natural considering the differing methods and
procedures used by businesses. Id. at 184. The Times Mirror court rejected the contention that
government is powerless to use a variety of method of computing taxes for various businesses,
including the press. Id. at 182.
122. See Arkansas Writers Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 235-36 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that state goals of avoiding imposition and collection of administratively
inefficient tax are legitimate).
123. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575, 602 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (describing administrative inconvenience of collecting
small sales tax on newspapers bought on street or at vending machine). Justice Rehnquist
noted that newspapers are often sold through different methods than other goods. Id.
124. See Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 526-27 (1959) (noting that states
are given flexibility in tax matters). The Supreme Court often has noted that tax matters are
given more flexibility with states than other matters. Id.
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standpoint, Leathers is a good result and should lead to better tax policy.121
One must always be aware, however, as was demonstrated in Grosjean,
26
that legislative flexibility can be destructive as well as constructive.
The policy arguments that support Leathers rely to some extent on the
First Amendment view that diversity is important to assist the dissemination
of information. 27 The Supreme Court rejected this diversity argument in
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo.lu However, that rejection occurred in the context of right of reply statutes that forced newspapers to
print responses or other articles to insure diversity. 29 In the context of
taxation and exemptions, where the courts give legislatures more deference,
states can point to important policy interests in fostering diversity and
increased dissemination of information through their tax policy, including
differential taxation of the media, which involves less intrusion than the
right of reply statutes. 30
Justice Marshall's dissent in Leathers, however, brings up several good
points that must be addressed in defense of the new taxation of the press
test.' Marshall remains concerned about the potential for abuse by state
legislatures referred to in Minneapolis Star.12 Marshall also expresses con-33
cern that courts should treat the press differently than mere speech.
Marshall ignores the fact, however, that Leathers wisely left three significant
protections for the media. 34 Although these protections were not sufficient
for Justice Marshall, they do address Marshall's stated concerns. 35 The key
125. See Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 603 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (observing that
legislative classifications are means to fit tax programs to local needs to achieve equitable
burdens).
126. See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936) (discussing legislative
abuse of tax power in order to punish press and limit dissemination of information).
127. See Lively, supra note 117, at 70-76 (arguing for government promotion of diversity
within First Amendment); Thomas I. Emerson, The Affirmative Side of The FirstAmendment,
15 GA. L. REv. 795, 815-22 (1981) (describing use of government subsidies to promote diversity
of expression).
128. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
129. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 245 (1974) (noting that
Florida right of reply statute affected choice of materials to be published and invaded editor's
function).
130. See supra notes 116-29 and accompanying text (discussing policy arguments for
differential taxation).
131. See Leathers v. Medlock, Ill S. Ct. 1438, 1447 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(criticizing majority opinion for leaving media largely unprotected from invidious taxation).
132. See id. at 1449-50 (discussing risk of power to discriminate between similar media
members).
133. See id. at 1453 (rejecting majority's reliance on Regan). In Leathers, Marshall noted
that "our cases on the selective taxation of the press struck a different position [than speech]."
Id. Marshall observed that the press clause "imposes a special obligation on government." Id.
See sources cited supra note 2 (reviewing argument for and against special press status under
First Amendment).
134. See Leathers, 111 S. Ct. at 1443-44 (noting important media protections and notifig
focus on censorial motive).
135. See id. at 1452 (complaining nondiscrimination principle of First Amendment is
essentially annihilated).
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focus for all three protections is the search for state censorship. 3 6
The first Court protection of the media arises when a tax singles out
the press.' Justice O'Connor stressed that the primary concern in this area
is censorship of both information and opinion.' A tax that applies to the
press as well as to other businesses is not dangerous to the dissemination
of information.3 9 The new Leathers test, therefore, looks at two factors to
see if a tax violates this prohibition of censorship.'14 The first factor is the
structure of the tax. 14' If circumstances surrounding the enactment of a tax
arouse suspicion, or if the legislature sets up the tax in such a way as to
42
curtail First Amendment press activity, the Court will strike down the tax.

The second factor is the impact of the tax.' 43 Justice O'Connor noted that

a tax that singles out the press may hinder the role of the press as a
government watchdog.'"4 The protection of a generally applicable tax exists
because the whole state is subject to the legislature's action, while a special

tax on the press lacks this safety.

4

This first protection for the media,

which at first seems limited to extreme cases such as Grosjean, actually will
protect the media against dangerous taxes while avoiding the overreaching
of Minneapolis Star, which preemptively struck down taxes that merely have
the potential for abuse, even though neither the structure nor the impact
of the tax demonstrated any evidence of censorship. 1'
The second protection of the Leathers test involves taxes that fall on a
small number of the media. 47 Justice O'Connor stressed again that the

136. See id. at 1443-44 (emphasizing censorship as key factor to look for in testing whether
state tax scheme will be required to meet strict scrutiny test).
137. Id. at 1443; see Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue,
460 U.S. 575, 585 (1983) (holding that singling out press for special tax is unconstitutional).
But see supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Rehnquist's argument that
singling out press for beneficial tax can be constitutional).
138. Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438, 1443 (1991).
139. Id.at 1444.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. In Gros/ean, the Louisiana tax was structured in a way to punish state newspapers.
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936). Although the Minneapolis Star
tax did not have illicit censorial motive, the tax specifically singled out the press for a tax
that no other member of the business community paid. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v.
Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 582 (1983).
143. Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438, 1444 (1991).
144. Id.
145. See Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 588 (describing danger of tax singling out press).
146. See Leathers, 111 S. Ct. at 1444 (reviewing Arkansas tax to see if it singles out
press). By prohibiting the state from singling out the press, Leathers forces states to subject
all citizens to the taxes imposed on the press. Id.
See McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 415, 433 (1819) (holding that tax on
Bank of United States was unconstitutional). In McCullough, Chief Justice John Marshall
noted that the power to tax is the power to destroy. Id. at 433. In that sense any tax on
anyone or any entity has the potential for abuse and the potential to curtail any one of a
number of fundamental rights. Id.
147. Leathers, 111 S. Ct. at 1444-45.
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primary concern for the Court was evidence of censorship of certain ideas
or viewpoints. 14 If a state taxed a small group of the media, the tax likely
would affect a small range of views. 149 Although the Court gives no precise
definition as to what constitutes a small number of speakers or media
members, Justice O'Connor makes clear that a search for censorship will
be conducted, and the smaller the number of taxed entities, the better the
chance that the Court will find censorship present. 50 Like the first protection, the Court analyzes this second protection by looking at the structure
of the tax.'" Under the new Leathers test, this analysis becomes more
searching as the possibility of viewpoint discrimination increases, thereby
providing substantial protection for the media when a danger of abridgement
of First Amendment rights exists. 5 2 When a large number of the media is
taxed, little danger of viewpoint censorship exists and Court protection,
therefore, is less necessary.' Leathers leaves open the question of exemptions for a small number of media members, as opposed to taxes on a
small number of media members.' 4 Under the Court's current analysis, it
appears that exemptions for a small number of media members would not
raise the same censorship concerns that a tax on a small number of media
members would raise.' 5s Although Justice Marshall himself will not likely
be impressed by this protection, the examination of the number of media
56
taxed adequately addresses most of Marshall's concerns.'

148. Id. at 1444.
149. Id. In Leathers, O'Connor noted that the tax in Ragland affected less than five
publications. Id. The tax in the Leathers case affected approximately 100 cable companies and
so the "sales tax to cable television hardly resembles a 'penalty for a few."' Id. (quoting
Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 592
(1983)).
150. See Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438, 1444-45 (1991) (discussing danger of tax
on small number of media members). Justice Marshall's dissent in Leathers raised the question
of where the Court will draw a line in the number of speakers necessary to remove the risk
of censorship. Id. at 1451. It really is unnecessary for the Court to answer this question
because no precise number of speakers exists; instead a sliding scale is present where the fewer
the media members taxed, the more likely the Court is to find censorship. Id. at 1444.
151. Id. at 1444.
152. See id. (noting danger of tax on small number of media members is that tax will
affect limited range of views); see also infra notes 172-81 and accompanying text (noting
suggested improvement in Leathers test to heightened rational basis test). This suggested
revision actually fits in well with Leathers' protections because the revision allows closer
scrutiny to search for censorship, which is the focus of the Leathers test. Id.
153. See Leathers, 111 S. Ct. at 1445 (observing that tax on larger number of media
members is unlikely to affect limited range of viewpoints).
154. See id. at 1444-45 (failing to mention situation when only small number of media
are exempt from generally applicable tax).
155. See id. (noting that if tax applies to general group no censorship concerns are raised).
156. See id. at 1451 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (rejecting majority analysis as overly
simplistic and unresponsive to his concerns). Despite Marshall's suspicion, the protection of
looking at the number of media taxed does address Marshall's concerns of the potential for
abuse of taxation on the press because Leathers looks for that abuse. Id. at 1449.
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The final protection given to the media is in the area of content-based
discrimination. 15 7 As Justice O'Connor notes, Ragland is one example of
legislative discrimination based on content.' For O'Connor, a search for
content-based discrimination really is a search for viewpoint discrimination

or censorial motive.5 9 The Leathers test, however, appears to analyze the
content area of the First Amendment differently from previous cases, in
the sense that subject-matter distinction, one type of content-based distinction, may be constitutional. 60 Although O'Connor uses the language of
Ragland, she defines the content area differently.' 6' The entire area of
content discrimination has been hotly debated and the Leathers shift in
emphasis is important. 62 Under Leathers the media is protected against
taxes that make distinctions based on ideas in a publication. 63 Protection
is unlikely, however, if a legislature based a tax distinction on the presence
of general interest news in a publication, or on the form or frequency of
a member of the media, because that distinction is based more on subjectmatter and less on viewpoint.' 64 The issue of how to define content discrim-

157. Id. at 1445.
158. Id. (citing Arkansas Writers Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 223 (1987), for
example of content-based discrimination). Ragland involved a tax exemption for religious,
trade, professional, or sports periodicals. Ragland, 481 U.S. at 226.
159. Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438, 1445 (1991).
160. See id. at 1443 (emphasizing viewpoint as focus of Supreme Court's search); Paul
B. Stephan III, The First Amendment And Content Discrimination, 68 VA. L. Ray. 203, 23150 (1982) (discussing different possible formations of content discrimination rules). Stephan
notes that viewpoint neutrality is one of five different conceptions of content definition that
he discerns. Id. at 231. These possible definitions range all the way to absolute content
neutrality where the government could never distinguish between any different kinds of speech.
Id. at 232. The three other theories, hierarchical neutrality, equal-or-greater neutrality, and
protected-speech neutrality are found at varying levels of a type of sliding scale of content.
Id. at 231-33. Justice O'Connor in Leathers largely uses content in the viewpoint sense.
Leathers, 111 S. Ct. at 1443.
161. Leathers, 111 S. Ct. at 1443.
162. See Stone, supra note 58, at 83-84 (noting that Supreme Court has had difficulty
defining content in its cases). The Court has analyzed two types of content-based definitions.
Id. at 82. The first deals with content in the sense of distinctions based on viewpoint or ideas.
Id. This viewpoint area is always looked at with the strictest scrutiny by the Court. Id. Another
area of content-based restriction deals with the "subject-matter" restrictions. Id. at 83. These
subject-matter restrictions regulate content in a broad sense, but do so without regard to
individual viewpoints. Id.
Justice O'Connor's approach in Leathers stresses that the first area of viewpoint discrimination would clearly invalidate a tax at issue. Leathers, 111 S. Ct. at 1443. However, since
the Arkansas tax at issue distinguished between scrambled satellite broadcasts and cable
television, but did not make reference to any content of the mediums, the Court did not have
to address the issue of a state tax system that used the subject-matter definition to define
content. Id.
See infra notes 191-202 and accompanying text (discussing Hearst Corp. v. Iowa Dep't.
of Revenue & Finance, 461 N.W.2d 295 (Iowa 1990), and its definition of content).
163. Leathers, II S. Ct. at 1443.
164. See Hearst Corp. v. Iowa Dep't. of Revenue & Finance, 461 N.W.2d 295, 303 (Iowa
1990) (holding Iowa tax defining newspapers for tax exemption met constitutional test), cert.
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ination is far too complex to be discussed adequately here, but the Leathers
case could affect the way the Court views the content-based discrimination
issue. 1651 One should bear in mind, however, that the third area of protection
will be available to the media, and the Supreme Court likely will look
1 6
unfavorably on statutes that make any viewpoint distinctions.
Use of the rational basis test will assist courts in keeping states from
abusing the flexibility that Leathers gives them. 67 The state still must show
a rational reason for treating members of the media differently. The use of
the rational basis test replaces the stricter compelling interest test which
almost no state tax differential could meet.168 Despite the positive change
that Leathers has brought about, however, the test could be improved by
use of a heightened rational basis test. 69
Although the Leathers test, as demonstrated above, is supportable on
both First Amendment constitutional grounds and policy grounds, there is
one improvement that would make the three Leathers protections even more
meaningful. 70 If the Supreme Court modified Leathers and applied a
heightened rational basis test to differential taxation of the press, then the
media's protection from unfair and irrational taxation would be enhanced. 7,'

denied, Ill S. Ct. 1639 (1991). The Iowa Supreme Court seemed to anticipate Leathers,
defining the use of some content in a statute as form or frequency when no viewpoint
discrimination was involved. Id. at 303. See Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438, 1443 (1991)
(emphasizing viewpoint discrimination as focus of Supreme Court's approach). In Leathers
cable television was contrasted with other members of the media. Id. at 1438.
165. See Leathers, Ill S. Ct. at 1443 (stressing viewpoint discrimination as focus of
Supreme Court's search); Hearst, 461 N.W.2d at 303 (arguing Iowa tax did not scrutinize
content of periodicals).
166. See Leathers, Ill S. Ct. at 1443-45 (finding Arkansas tax not content-based in terms
of viewpoint discrimination).
167. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (applying rational
basis test with heightened level of scrutiny in certain contexts).
168. See Arkansas Writers Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987) (demonstrating
difficulty of meeting compelling interest test).
169. See infra notes 170-76 and accompanying text (suggesting improvements in Leathers
test).
170. See supra notes 99-108 (supporting Leathers test as superior to Ragland or Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983)).
171. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446 (using rational basis test to overturn local zoning
ordinance). Cleburne involved a zoning ordinance that required a special use permit for a
home for the mentally retarded. Id. at 447. The Supreme Court decided that the mentally
retarded would not be given special status as a suspect or quasi-suspect class under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 446. Therefore, the local zoning
ordinance was subject to a rational basis test. Id. The Court defined rational basis as legislation
"rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose." Id. In applying this rational basis
test, the Court seemed to use heightened scrutiny by looking closely at the state purpose and
the state means. Id. at 447-50. The Court used a heightened rational basis test because of
concerns for discrimination against the mentally retarded. Id. at 442-47.
This same argument is valid in examining the taxation of the press question. The press
plays a vital role and therefore a Court should look carefully at state taxes on part of the
press. Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438, 1443 (1991). This careful look can most effectively
be done in the context of a heightened rational basis test, which both protects the press and
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The use of a more stringent rational basis test would add more to media
protection and require the states to support differential taxation with legitimate reasons and detailed arguments. 72 A good example of a more stringent
look at state reasons can be found in Hearst Corp. v. Iowa Department of
Revenue & Finance.73 This heightened rational basis approach would be
consistent with Leathers because if state interests were not rational after a
close examination, an indication would exist of some ulterior or censorial
motive, the very goal that Leathers tried to identify and prevent. 7 4 The
heightened test would allow the Court to look more carefully at state
justifications.' 7- Although the Leathers opinion does not require a stronger
version of rational basis, it is likely that state courts, in applying Leathers,
76
will adopt this approach in an effort to provide media protection.
IV.

IMPACT AND REACTION

The strong reaction to Leathers is a testament to the sweeping nature
of the decision. 77 The media reaction generally has been that Leathers is
an apocalyptic event. 7 8 This is not the case. Leathers represents a truly
necessary and positive change from the Ragland standard. 79 If the Supreme
Court had continued down the road it was traveling, the long term effect

gives states a chance to justify their tax schemes as legitimate. Hearst Corp. v. Iowa Dep't of
Revenue & Finance, 461 N.W.2d 295, 306 (Iowa 1990).
172. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 447-50 (1985) (detailing
state motives and objectives in local zoning ordinance).
173. See Hearst Corp. v. Iowa Dep't. of Revenue & Finance, 461 N.W.2d 295, 306 (Iowa
1990) (looking seriously at state goals and means state chose of differential taxation), cert.
denied, II1 S. Ct. 1639 (1991). Iowa justified its differential tax exemption for newspapers by
asserting an interest in encouraging reading of newspapers and administrative economy and
practicality in tax structure. Id.
174. See Leathers, 111 S. Ct. at 1443-45 (searching for censorial motive).
175. See Hearst, 461 N.W.2d at 306 (examining Iowa's justifications for differential tax);
Leathers, 111 S. Ct. at 1447 (declaring Arkansas tax passed rational basis test). One criticism
of Leathers is its failure to look more closely at the justifications offered by Arkansas. Id.
176. See infra notes 219-22 and accompanying text (noting that state courts will protect
press by looking carefully at state justifications for differential taxation).
177. See Dyk & Kulwicki, supra note 2, at 54 (noting long-term consequences of Leathers).
Dyk and Kulwicki note that Leathersis "unexpected in scope and far-reaching in consequence."
Id. Justice Marshall's dissent in Leathers is an indication that the majority opinion is sweeping
in nature and represents more than a mere incremental change. Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S.
Ct. 1438, 1452 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
178. See Dyk & Kulwicki, supra note 2, at 60 (concluding that Leathers will have significant
negative impact on media); see also David Westin, Remarks at the Meeting of the American
Bar Association Forum on Communications Law (Sept. 25, 1991) (listing negative effects of
Leathers on media). Westin argued that some less popular media such as cable television would
be taxed more by state legislatures. Id. Westin also expressed federalism concerns that fifty
different state tax schemes would have a chilling effect on the media. Id.
179. See supra notes 99-130 and accompanying text (supporting Leathers on both constitutional and policy grounds).
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on the media would have been surprisingly negative.' 80 Uniform taxation of
the press would have done more to harm new technologies and fledgling
publications. 8' Minneapolis Star and Ragland swept too broadly, and Leathers was needed to steer a more sensible course. 8 2 Under Leathers, the media
have lost no crucial First Amendment protections because Leathers retains
a structure in which the press will be protected from invidious or harmful
taxation. 83 The new Leathers test, and it is new, will, in the long run,
provide for a more reasonable view of taxation of the media and its impact
on the First Amendment.'8 Additionally, room exists for improvement in
the Leathers approach.8 5 As courts apply Leathers they likely will move
toward the aforementioned heightened rational basis test of their own
86
volition.
A.

State courts

Leathers certainly will have a great impact on state court decisions
dealing with states' attempts to tax members of the press differently. 8 7 In
the years immediately preceding Leathers, several state courts came down
on opposite sides of the question left open by Ragland.'88 Before the Leathers
change in course, most state courts read the Supreme Court's taxation of
the media cases broadly and struck down any differential taxes on the
media. 8 9 In 1987, for example, the Louisiana Court of Appeals found that
a sales tax exemption given to newspapers and denied to other publications
was unconstitutional under the First Amendment.9° The Louisiana court

180. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text (noting that smaller publishers might
have been hurt by uniform taxation).
181. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 86-98 and accompanying text (observing how Minneapolis Star and
Ragland set standards too broadly for taxation of press).
183. See supra notes 137-66 and accompanying text (discussing protections for media in
Leathers test).
184. See supra notes 109-30 and accompanying text (supporting Leathers test as sensible

approach to state taxation of media).
185. See supra notes 170-76 and accompanying text (suggesting improved test for Leathers
using heightened rational basis).
186. See infra notes 219-22 (discussing prospect that states will use form of heightened

rational basis test while analyzing taxation of press questions).
187. See Dyk & Kulwicki, supra note 2, at 54 (noting that Leathers will lead to increasing
state litigation as state courts struggle to deal with results of new test); see also infra notes

190-97, 199-202 and accompanying text (reviewing state court decisions in Tennessee, Florida,
Iowa, Louisiana, and New York).
188. See infra notes 190-97, 199-202 and accompanying text (discussing taxation of press
cases in Oklahoma, New York, Iowa, Louisiana, and Tennessee).
189. See Dyk and Kulwicki, supra note 2, at 58 (noting that state courts often gave
taxation of media decisions broad meaning); see also Richard J. Tofel, Is Differential Taxation
of Press Entities by States Constitutional?,73 J. TAx'N 42, 43 (1990) (noting that state courts
seemed to agree with Ragland that intermedia differential taxation is unconstituiional).'
190. See Louisiana Life, Ltd. v. McNamara, 504 So. 2d 900, 906 (La. Ct. App. 1987)

(holding that newspaper exemption from state sales tax not applying to magazines is constitutionally impermissible).
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interpreted Minneapolis Star broadly and found that distinctions between
any members of the media for tax purposes infringes on First Amendment
rights.' 9 1 Two years later in New York, the State Appeals Court found that
a franchise tax on advertising in magazines was invalid. 92 The court held
that treating the broadcast media differently from the print media violated
the First Amendment. 193
In two companion cases in 1990, the Supreme Court of Tennessee ruled
that a state sales tax on subscriptions that exempted newspapers and not
magazines violated the First Amendment. 94 The Florida Supreme Court
agreed with the Tennessee court and found a newspaper exemption unconstitutional because magazines' First Amendment rights were violated. 95
Florida's interest in promoting the immediate dissemination of news did not
meet the court's strict scrutiny test. '6 The Oklahoma Supreme Court also
decided two cases in 1990 that held differential taxes violative of the First
97
Amendment. 1

191. Id. at 902. The McNamara Court noted that "[a]n exemption which exempts some
publications but not all publications constitutes an infringement of First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights." Id.
192. See McGraw-Hill, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 541 N.Y.S.2d 252, 255 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1989) (holding that state advertising regulation that differentiated between broadcast
media and print media is unconstitutional).
193. Id. at 255. The New York Court noted that "the difference in treatment between
the print and broadcast media under (the New York statute) violates the Ist Amendment
guarantee of freedom of the press." Id. New York had failed to meet the compelling interest
test required to uphold the regulation. Id.
194. See Newsweek, Inc. v. Celauro, 789 S.W.2d 247, 250 (Tenn. 1990); Southern Living,
Inc. v. Celauro, 789 S.W.2d 251, 252 (Tenn. 1990) (holding that state sales tax law that taxed
some magazine subscriptions but not newspapers violates First Amendment and is not content
neutral). The Tennessee Court noted poignantly in Southern Living that "[i]t is not a legitimate
function of the government to decide which form of information furthers better the public
interest." Southern Living, 789 S.W.2d at 253. But see supra notes 116-30 and accompanying
text (discussing public policy arguments for why states have legitimate interest in at least
assisting in diversity of information dissemination).
195. See Department of Revenue v. Magazine Publishers of Am., 565 So. 2d 1304, 1306
(Fla. 1990) (holding that state sales tax on secular magazines which contained exemption for
newspapers violates magazines' First Amendment rights).
196. Id. The Florida Court read Minneapolis Star and Ragland broadly and found that
"Florida's statutory differentiation between secular magazines and newspapers for purposes of
sales taxation burdens rights protected by the First Amendment." Id. at 1306. The Florida
Court noted the danger of abuse of differential treatment of the press in taxation even if there
was no improper censorial motive shown. Id. at 1307. In interpreting Arkansas Writers Project
v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987), the Court stated that "Ragland stands for the proposition
that the First Amendment prohibits a state from identifying a class or group of publications
protected by the First Amendment and imposing a differential, discriminatory tax on some
members of the class or group." Id. This interpretation of Ragland was narrowed in Leathers
by clarifying that differential taxation was prohibited when a small group was singled out, the
entire press was singled out, or viewpoint discrimination existed. See supra notes 54-59 and
accompanying text (discussing Leathers holding and relation to Ragland).
197. See Oklahoma Broadcasters Assoc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 789 P.2d 1312, 1316
(Okla. 1990) (holding that imposing sales tax on broadcast licensing agreements while exempting
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The state court decisions handed down before Leathers seemed to assume
that the Supreme Court was on course to declare all differential taxation
of any branch of the press impermissible under the First Amendment.' 98
Iowa's Supreme Court, however, decided that a state tax scheme in which
newspapers were exempted and magazines were not did not violate the First
Amendment.'I The Iowa court held that the tax differential did not discriminate between a small group of similar media members, nor was it
directed at the content of the publications. 2°° The Court ruled that the Iowa
tax examined the "form and frequency" of the publication and not the
content. 2° 1 Although this analysis is slightly different from the Leathers
emphasis on viewpoint discrimination, the result is similar-states permissibly may distinguish between different types of media. 20 2
The Supreme Court, in light of Leathers, has vacated the Florida
decision and denied certiorari to the Iowa and Tennessee decisions. 2 3 The
denial of certiorari to the Tennessee decision may appear inconsistent with
the Leathers result, but, considering the reliance of the Tennessee Supreme
Court on the Tennessee Constitution and the heavy content-based nature
of the Tennessee statute, it is not inconsistent. 204 Instead of looking to
Ragland, which was critical of a state's ability to exempt some segments of
the media, state courts now must look to the Leathers test. 205 The Leathers

similar agreements with radio and newspapers violated First Amendment); Dow Jones & Co.,
v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 787 P.2d 843, 846 (Okla. 1990) (holding that sales and use tax
exemption for newspapers and periodicals sold for less than 75 cents burdened First Amendment
rights).
198. See supra notes 190-97 and accompanying text (discussing state court decisions on
taxation of press). All of these state decisions in Oklahoma, New York, Louisiana, Tennessee
and Florida actually held differential taxes which exempted one media segment subject to a
compelling state interest test. Id.
199. Hearst Corp. v. Iowa Dep't. of Revenue & Finance, 461 N.W.2d 295, 306 (Iowa
1990) (holding that First Amendment does not bar state sales tax from exempting one form
of media and not another and that distinction was not content-based), cert. denied, I11 S.
Ct. 1639 (1991).
200. Id. at 302-03.
201. Id. at 303.
202. Id. The Iowa tax statute exempted newspapers and defined newspapers as containing
"news, articles of opinion (editorials), features, advertising, or other matter regarded as of
current interest." Id. at 300.
203. See Newsweek,, Inc. v. Celauro, 789 S.W.2d 247, 250 (Tenn. 1990) (holding sales
tax which exempted newspapers but not magazines unconstitutional), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
1639 (1991); Hearst, 461 N.W.2d at 306 (holding tax which exempted newspapers but not
other periodicals was constitutional); Department of Revenue v. Magazine Publishers of Am.,
565 So. 2d 1304, 1306 (Fla. 1990) (holding newspaper exemption from sales tax unconstitutional), vacated, 111 S. Ct. 1614 (1991).
204. See Celauro, 789 S.W.2d at 252 (noting Court's reliance on Tennessee Constitution);
see also Dyk & Kulwicki, supra note 2, at 58 (noting Tennessee tax discriminated on basis of
content). The Tennessee statute differed from the Iowa statute at issue in Hearst because the
Tennessee statute used more actual content in the definition. Id.
205. See Dyk & KuIwicki, supra note 2, at 54 (noting importance to state courts of new
Leathers test).
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test should be easy and straightforward to apply. 206 A state tax that taxes
the media differentially is constitutional if the state can show a legitimate
interest achieved through rational means and if there is no censorial motive
demonstrated by the legislature. 207 State courts can look to the protections
20
outlined by Leathers to determine whether censorial motive is present. 1
Perhaps the major confusion for state courts will be how to determine if a
state statute taxes the press differentially based on content to the point of
2
viewpoint discrimination. 01
Justice O'Connor's opinion in Leathers made clear that content-based
discrimination did not mean that any distinctions between different segments
of the media were necessarily based on content. 210 By contrast the Ragland
Court had implied that content-based distinctions involved almost all legislative distinctions. 21 1 The Leathers Court instead focused on viewpointbased and idea-based discrimination instead of distinctions of form, frequency, or even subject-matter.2 1 2 State courts will have to deal with this
question and address the distinction between form and content. 213 In Hearst,
the Iowa Supreme Court decided that a distinction between newspapers and
magazines was not content-based. 2 4 The Hearst court reached this conclusion
although the definition of a newspaper in the statute was written in terms
of the types of articles the publication contained. 21 5

206. See Hearst Corp. v. Iowa Dep't. of Revenue & Finance, 461 N.W.2d 295, 306 (Iowa
1990) (performing application quite similar to that of Leathers), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1639
(1991). The Hearst case as well as Leathers itself reflect the straightforward nature of the
rational basis test. Id.
207. See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text (describing goals of Leathers test).
208. See supra notes 137-66 and accompanying text (outlining Leathers protections which
search for censorial motive).
209. See Hearst, 461 N.W.2d at 303 (attempting to determine if Iowa tax was contentbased).
210. See Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438, 1443 (1991) (emphasizing search for
viewpoint-based discrimination). Leathers clearly allowed states to make distinctions between
members of the media, but it remains unclear what the permissible range is for how states
can define their exemptions. Viewpoint-based distinctions, such as all Republican newspapers
would be unconstitutional. Id. at 1443. However, distinctions such as that made by Iowa in
the Hearst case between newspapers that provide general interest news and other periodicals
appear to pass the Leathers test. Hearst, 461 N.W.2d at 303.
211. See Arkansas Writers Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 229-30 (1987) (emphasizing
negative aspects of content-based distinctions).
212. See Leathers, I11 S. Ct. at 1443 (emphasizing search for viewpoint based discrimination); Hearst Corp. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue & Finance, 461 N.W.2d 295, 303 (Iowa 1990)
(noting form and frequency distinctions do not really involve content), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 1639 (1991); see also Stephan, supra note 161, at 231-50 (observing that several different
definitions exist for content under First Amendment).
213. See Hearst, 461 N.W.2d at 303 (dealing with form and frequency distinction in state
tax). The Hearst court's use of form and frequency is similar to the second type of content
definitions, subject-matter. See Stone, supra note 58, at 83-84 (reviewing two types of contentbased distinctions, subject-matter and viewpoint).
214. See Hearst, 461 N.W.2d at 303 (noting form of publication is not considered contentbased distinction).
215. See id. at 300 (defining newspaper in Iowa statute). This statutory definition was
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The expected impact of Leathers on state courts is that Leathers will
remind them that concerns about content-based distinctions should be
focused on distinctions based on ideas and viewpoints, not mere form or
subject-matter. 2 6 This change in the Leathers test should help state courts
focus on true cases of censorship and should begin to allow state legislatures
more deference to craft sensible and fair tax structures. 217 State courts still
may be faced with state constitutional challenges, but the Supreme Court
no longer requires that state courts use a strict scrutiny examination merely
because a statute contains exemptions for one form of the media yet taxes
another. 2 s
State courts, while grappling with differential taxation of the press
problems, likely will find it necessary to utilize the heightened standard of
rational basis review suggested earlier. 2 9 To give full effect to the three
protections the Supreme Court laid out in Leathers, states will look carefully
at state justifications for evidence of censorial motive. 220 Although Leathers
will and should be the main guide for the states, to insure maximum
protection for the media, state courts will likely want to look more closely
than mere low level rational basis.2' For example, the Hearst court appropriately looked closely at Iowa's justifications and at the state definition of
a newspaper, and the result was a perfect example of how the Leathers test
will likely work in practice. 222
B. State Legislatures
The impact of the Leathers decision on state legislatures likely will be
dramatic. 223 In the eyes of many members of the media, states will rush to
clearly not viewpoint based, but does involve content in the broader sense, just not the sense
used by Leathers. Id. at 303.
See Reply Brief on Remand for Appellant at I (Revenue Department), Department of
Revenue v. Magazine Publishers of America, Inc., 565 So. 2d 1304 (Fla. 1990) (arguing that
some examination of content in tax exemption is allowable), vacated, 111 S. Ct. 1614 (1991).
The Revenue Commissioner in Florida noted that Hearst revealed that "an examination of
content is not entirely foreclosed as a consideration, so long as it is not the primary focus of
the determination." Id. This analysis of Hearst makes clear that at least some content language
in a statutory definition is acceptable, presumably, if the primary focus is on content, viewpoint
discrimination is indicated. Id.
216. See Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438, 1443 (1991) (emphasizing search for
viewpoint discrimination).
217. See supra notes 116-30 and accompanying text (focusing on policy support for
Leathers).
218. See Leathers, 111 S. Ct. at 1445 (noting Arkansas tax does not have censorial motive
and therefore is not subject to strict scrutiny).
219. See supra notes 170-76 and accompanying text (discussing application of heightened
rational basis standard).
220. See Hearst Corp. v. Iowa Dep't. of Revenue & Finance, 461 N.W.2d 295, 306 (Iowa
1990) (scrutinizing carefully state justifications for tax differential), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct
1639 (1991); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 447-50 (1985) (scrutinizing
carefully justifications for local zoning ordinance).
221. See Hearst, 461 N.W.2d at 306 (reviewing state justifications in order that court can
be sure of result).
222. See id. (looking closely at state justifications for state tax differential).
223. See Dyk & Kulwicki, supra note 2, at 59 (noting large impact Leathers will have on
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impose taxes on previously exempt members of the media2 4 That certainly
will be true in financially strapped states.? The long-term situation, however, is likely to be less onerous to the media.n6 State tax codes should
begin to reflect sensible policies of flexibility and fairness. " 7 The suggested
revision of Leathersto look more closely at state justifications would require
state legislatures to make their intentions clear in the statutes or legislative
histories. 22
The issue of content-based definitions particularly becomes problematic
for state legislatures in deciding how to separate similar members of the
media. 229 Arkansas, in the Leathers case, originally had taxed cable television
but exempted scrambled broadcasts.230 The Supreme Court allowed this
differential because the two media members were similar in content, and,
therefore, no content-based discrimination was present' 31 Several state legislatures recently have dealt with this problem in light of Leathers and come
232
to different results.
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania recently considered repealing an
exemption for the press and imposing a six percent periodical tax. 233 The
proposed bill defined the term "periodical" in terms similar to the Iowa
statute at issue in Hearst.23 4 The proposed tax makes distinctions as to form
and frequency. 235 If this tax were being reviewed under Leathers, the

states). Because of its new approach to taxation of the press, Leathers could generate a "flurry
of legislative activity." Id.

224. See Arthur B. Sackler, Remarks at the Meeting of the American Bar Association
Forum on Communications Law (Sept. 25, 1991) (observing that state governments will be
more aggressive in taxing media).
225. See id. (noting that California and Connecticut have begun to change tax structure
in light of Leathers).

226. See supra notes 109-14 and accompanying text (discussing positive impact of Leathers
on state taxing schemes).
227. See supra notes 116-30 and accompanying text (advancing public policy arguments

in support of Leathers).
228. See supra notes 170-76 and accompanying text (suggesting improvements in Leathers
test by using heightened rational basis test).
229. See Hearst Corp. v. Iowa Dep't. of Revenue & Finance, 461 N.W.2d 295, 300 (Iowa
1990) (discussing Iowa's attempt to define newspapers), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1639 (1991).
230. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text (discussing Arkansas sales tax on cable

television and exemption for scrambled satellite broadcasting).
231. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
232. See infra notes 233-39 and accompanying text (discussing situations in California and
Pennsylvania).
233. Pennsylvania House Bill 840, Sess. 1991.

234. Id. House Bill 840 defined periodical as "regularly published at intervals not exceeding
three months, which is circulated to the generally [sic] public and which contains either matters
of general interest or reports of current events of is devoted to literature, sports, the sciences,
art or some other special industry or area of interest." Id.

235. See Hearst Corp. v. Iowa Dep't. of Revenue & Finance, 461 N.W.2d 295, 303 (Iowa
1990) (noting that legislature used form and frequency to define tax differential and holding
differential constitutional), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1639 (1991).
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reviewing Court would have to look to state justifications and test them
6
against the means used to differentially tax periodicals.2
The State of California repealed an exemption for newspapers and
periodicals but allowed an exception for newspapers distributed without
charge.237 This type of differential is an example of a state legislature using
its flexibility in tax matters sensibly.238 Leathers' looser definition of contentbased discrimination allowed the state legislature to argue that this tax
exemption is constitutional?239
The potential for abuse from state legislatures always exists, but Leathers
gives legislatures the flexibility to rationally exempt and tax members of the
media like other businesses.m° One negative impact on state legislatures will
be dealing with increased lobbying from different media organizations.2'
Some members of the media, in an effort to gain exemptions, likely will
work to gain clout in state houses in hopes of bettering their position. 2
This increased lobbying, however, falls into the potential for abuse category.23 If the lobbying causes states to tax differentially in a censorial or
irrational way, causing actual abuse, the Leathers test is available to protect
2
discriminated members of the media. "
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court in Minneapolis Star moved too hastily into the
taxation of the press area. After ten years of confusion and increasing
litigation on the state level, the Court has used Leathers to pull back from
its previous unwise position. In Minneapolis Star, the Court based its ruling
on shaky constitutional grounds and ignored policy considerations. Leathers,
while not explicitly overruling the earlier cases, limited them to more sensible

236. See supra notes 167-76 and accompanying text (discussing application of Leathers

test).
237. See California A.B. 2181, Sess. 1991; Regulation 1590 (defining newspaper and

periodical for purposes of state tax scheme).
238. See supranotes 116-30 and accompanying text (stating policy justification for allowing
states tax flexibility).

239. See Opinion of Legislative Counsel of California at 8-9, Sales and Use Taxes:
Elimination of Exemptions, (June 9, 1991) (advising that differential taxes between free and

paid newspapers is constitutional under Leathers).
240. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575, 601 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (observing that Supreme Court will be able to stop

actual abuse when it occurs).
241. See Arthur B. Sackler, Remarks at the Meeting of the American Bar Association
Forum on Communications Law (September 25, 1991) (noting that result of Leathers will be
increased lobbying by media). As well as increased lobbying, Sackler observed that the increased
pressure on the media to lobby state legislatures would lead to internecine struggles for power

between different segments of the media. Id.
242. Id.
243. See Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 601 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (observing that
Supreme Court can handle potential for abuse cases when they turn to actual abuse).
244. See Leathers v. Mediock, 111 S. Ct. 1438, 1443-45 (1991) (noting that tax falling on
small number of media is suspect).
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results. Leathers is a decision based both on policy justifications and on
solid constitutional foundations.
The improvement suggested here, using a heightened rational basis test,
has the potential to make the Leathers approach even better. Perhaps states
will abuse the flexibility that Leathers provides and the Supreme Court will
be forced to revisit the taxation of the press area. For the present, however,
the Court is wise to pull back from strict scrutiny and let the states and
the press work together to achieve fair taxation and a free press. Leathers
can be a victory for both the press and the states.
ROBERT M.
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